Theory and empirical capturing of the third sector at the macro level

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Content

1. Executive summary

This report describes how ITSSOIN will theoretically and methodologically approach the structural capturing of the third sector. The main theoretical frameworks at the macro level that will be used to generate a comparative perspective on the third sector, volunteering, and social innovation in the nation states involved in the ITSSOIN project are (1) welfare regimes, (2) social origins theory, and (3) the varieties of capitalism approach. Through applying third sector empirical data to these theoretical frameworks, country specific similarities and differences will be reflected. Thus, a theoretically informed comparative empirical overview of country-specific settings of the third sector in ITSSOIN countries will be provided. This will not only advance the conceptualisation of welfare state shifts in view of current data, but also inform the selection of case studies across the target countries. A short account of field theory will be employed to describe how we expect to frame the empirical case analysis to gain more detailed insights into social innovation processes and actor involvement across activity fields and countries – that is how we intend to move from these macro level observations to the meso level of organisations and the micro level of engaged individuals.

2. Introduction

In a previous project report it was argued that the impact of the third sector can be assessed through studying its involvement in social innovation (Anheier et al., 2014).[1] It has further been argued that the involvement of the third sector in social innovation will be markedly more pronounced than the involvement of the state or the commercial sector, and that the third sector is thus 'better' at social innovation than alternative societal spheres. This reasoning was supported by outlining commonalities between social innovation and third sector properties – structural and values-based ones.

First of all, both social innovation and the third sector are clearly social needs-oriented (Nock, Krlev, & Mildenberger, 2013). The proximity to target groups makes the third sector fit for identifying challenges and also for developing adequate solutions.

Second, due to their wide stakeholder networks and thus their openness to external influences, third sector organisations are not only able to mobilise resources for transforming ideas into solution models (Ben-Ner & Gui, 2003; Donoghue, 2003; Kramer, 1981; Prewitt, 1999; The Young Foundation, 2012), but also to enhance the legitimacy formation surrounding these solutions (Krlev, Bund, & Mildenberger, 2014), which is a critical success factor for social innovation and for innovation in general (Rogers, 2003). A significant moderator to both, resource mobilisation and legitimacy formation, is the non-profits' high degree of social capital resulting from civic engagement within or arising from these organisations (Evers, Ewert, & Brandsen, 2014; Ranci, Costa, Sabatinelli, & Brandsen, 2012). The third sector's wide stakeholder reach may not apply equally to all types of organisations. In this respect, social movements in their early stages, protest organisations or counter-culture associations, and specifically 'bonding associations' as per Putnam's (2006) concept of bonding social capital, will be limited. If we look at innovation, which only attains its innovative property through the acceptance by the majority of a given (sub-) sphere, these organisations are also unlikely to create social innovation. Furthermore, since they are likely to represent a minority within the broad third sector landscape, we can sustain the assertion that the third sector's broad multi-stakeholder contacts are supportive of social innovation.

Third, third sector organisations are not either service providers (Ben-Ner & van Hoomissen, 1991) or advocates (Jenkins, 2006). Instead, we can see that both functions have a mutually reinforcing effect (Valentinov, Hielscher S., & Pies I., 2013). Therefore, third sector

[1] Although we defined in this previous report what we subsume under the term 'third sector,' this definition shall be repeated here for reasons of clarity and completeness. We generally include social movements or activist groups and also social enterprises, since in the EU their conceptual focus is less on surplus then for instance in the US European Commission (2013). However, it is generally hard to identify these entities unambiguously, since they span organisational and legal forms and are mostly not accounted for in distinct and separate ways. Therefore, the present contribution will focus on the 'International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations' (Salamon & Anheier,1992a; Salamon & Anheier, 1992b). In relation to the latter, organisational forms based on three structural archetypes will be considered: membership-based (associations), liability-based (corporations), and asset-based (foundations) organisations. Mutual societies and cooperatives play an intermediary role combining membership-based and liability-based structural types.

organisations are likely to be able to foster both functionalist (improving effectiveness) as well as transformationalist (driving social change and improvement) aspects of social innovation (Crepaldi, Rosa, & Pesce, 2012).

Fourth, with regard to functionalist but also transformationalist social innovation, non-profits are relatively free of market pressures (Hansmann, 1980) – a characteristic that enables them to test and experiment with new ideas, which is found to provide a significant stimulus to innovation in general (Saxenian, 1994). Third sector organisations can dedicate themselves more to longer-term policies than shareholder-owned companies. This is because they are free from the threat of a hostile takeover, should share prices fall. Also, short-term incentives such as stock options that lead to a focus on boosting share prices are non-existent. Along with innovation for their beneficiaries innovative practices such as training to up-skill or new forms of work organization are encouraged and can be persisted by third sector organisations over time.

Fifth and finally, third sector organisations' 'utopian' agendas (Crossley, 1999; Schmitz, in press) and these organisations' pronounced focus on values (Scheuerle, Schmitz, & Hoelz, 2013) shape an open organisational culture and foster actor dedication, both of which are seen as critical enablers for innovation (Hogan & Coote, 2014).

The present report starts from this general definition of social innovation and third sector properties and intends to explore how the connections between social innovation and the third sector are moderated by the embeddedness of the third sector in national welfare states, which show a significant degree of cross-national variation. There is a rich body of literature that distinguishes determinant factors of welfare state conceptions and political economies at the macro level. Some of the relevant approaches have originated some time ago and need to be updated; others are far more recent and are developing dynamically. We posit that a review of welfare state variances and their underlying conceptualisation will subsequently facilitate targeted research on how actor and role constellations differ with regard to third sector involvement in social innovation, whereby a system-based approach which is gaining prevalence in the study of innovation will be taken. (Christopherson, Kitson, & Michie, 2008). In this way, the ITSSOIN research will proceed from the macro level of nation states to the meso level of organisations and organisational fields, and will also include the micro level of individual innovation actors within organisations or informal groups (with a particular focus on volunteers). As a point of departure at the macro level we propose to review welfare regime typologies (Esping-Andersen, 1990), varieties of capitalism involved (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012), and the social origins theory of non-profit organisations (Anheier, 2013; Salamon & Anheier, 1992b, Salamon & Anheier, 1998).

It should be remarked that in this contribution alone we will not be able to determine the overarching interplay of factors that contribute to social innovation; we rather intend the whole ITSSOIN project to advance this comprehensive perspective. The conceptual foundations have been laid in our first project report (Anheier et al., 2014). Based on the implications resulting thereof that highlight the importance of the third sector in social innovation, we will particularly focus on context factors that affect the third sector. The research results we will present may of course be made more comprehensive, for instance by means of a structural network analysis, which more closely examines the interplay and the interactions between the third sector, the state, and the market. Nonetheless, we regard the present analysis as an important, timely and indispensable step in laying the foundations for social innovation research that adopts a cross-national comparative perspective and is taking seriously the most fundamental modifiers of third sector engagement and their enhancing or inhibiting effect on social innovation.

Researchers have recently addressed the convergence between welfare state and third sector regimes (Henriksen, Smith, & Zimmer, 2012), which might relativise the usefulness of the proposed approach. But despite some dimensions that show signs of commonalities, '[t]he study [has] also reveal[ed] that fundamental aspects of state – nonprofit relations persist despite trends of convergence' (Henriksen et al., 2012, p. 458). This serves as another rationale for the appropriateness of our approach. As just mentioned, a more in-depth discussion (including trends of convergence and divergence) or more detailed insights into the functions and roles of the third sector in relation to social innovation will result from the qualitative parts of the ITSSOIN research.

The guiding research questions of the present quantitative and macro-level investigation are: What are the expectations in terms of social innovation that arise from the above mentioned variety of theories; and how are size and scope of the third sector, including civic engagement, related to them?

To address these questions, we will proceed as follows: against the background of the state-of-the art knowledge of the third sector arising from a comparative welfare perspective, we intend to discuss these theoretical frameworks in more detail, including cross-national comparisons and reflecting country specific conditions with reference to the third sector and social innovations. We then intend to fill the frameworks with updated structural accounts of third sector data from each of the partner countries (including, for instance, third sector expenditures, funding, or workforce). Through the application of such key variables we will provide a theoretically-informed map of the third sector for each of the countries and use the resulting implications to formulate hypotheses on social innovation at the macro level in a separate document. To advance these insights throughout the ITSSOIN research process, field theory will be presented (as a connective device) in the concluding chapter of this document.

Field theory provides an analytical framework that helps describing connections between actors, interests, resources, and structures. It will thus help complement the structural accounts provided here by value-based and perception-based accounts of empirical data (on citizen and media attitudes towards the sector) as well as by qualitative in-depth case studies on how the third sector is involved in social innovation. In the case studies to be performed we will not only aim at choosing comparative cases that offer high explanatory potential; we also want to make sure to select countries representing different European welfare conceptions in each of the operational fields that are to be investigated. This is the other important function the present document has in view of the entire ITTSOIN research programme.

3. Current accounts of the third sector and gaps

The majority of research projects addressing the third sector across different countries share the following feature: they were performed from an economic perspective with the main objective of estimating the contribution of the sector to GDP and employment. Current accounts are rarely updated on an annual basis, and even if they are, there is no research systematically covering the third sector as a whole at a national scale, with only few exceptions (for Spain see Rey García & Álvarez González, 2011). The focus lies on descriptive data, and the dimension of impact remains limited to the profile and number of beneficiaries addressed. Besides, relations to theoretical conceptions of welfare states and political economies and temporal shifts therein are rarely established.

This situation provides a point of reference, however delicate, but more efforts are needed to complete the third sector image and concept. A step forward in that direction with a focus on social economy as a fertile ground for social innovation has recently been proposed (Hubrich, Bund, Schmitz, & Mildenberger, 2012, Hubrich, Schmitz, Mildenberger, & Bund, 2012) in direct reference to the UK, Denmark, Poland, Germany, Greece, and Portugal.

The quantitative data show that third sector organisations are important in creating jobs and substantially contribute to the GDP. However, it still needs to be analysed what other contributions these organisations make, especially with respect to innovation. In some countries (e.g. the UK or the Netherlands) there is a tendency to develop quasi-markets in the public sector (such as in social care) and to professionalise third sector organisations. In this respect there is a risk that these organisations will turn into enterprises overridden by economic rationales, which is not simply a reflection of the more general trend towards hybrid organisations any more (which could still be seen as a potentially viable mixing and merging of traits that to some degree affects literally all partner countries) (Anheier & Krlev, 2014b). The trend towards marketisation is a contested issue. Many organisations feel uneasy about it and therefore struggle to reinvent themselves as *civil society* organisations. They strengthen their advocacy activities and develop new fields of activity in order to engage citizens in their work (with one prominent example being community development).

In contrast to this, other fields find it more difficult to move away from the dictates of service provision, which are connected to mechanisms (such as the exploitation of vulnerable workers) otherwise rather known in the for-profit service provision sector (see, for instance, Garrow and Hasenfeld's 2014 critical discussion of work integration social enterprises). From this perspective, the mutually reinforcing nexus between service provision and advocacy has to be put into question. It has to be explored in which direction these (partly opposing) processes go and which implications on actor constellations and for the emergence of social innovation in particular this has.

Volunteering has traditionally been an important part of third sector investigation. A thorough description of the different surveys and the available data across countries can be found in the report 'Volunteering in the European Union' (GHK, 2010). Research on voluntary activity of individuals started mostly in the 1980s. Statistics in this area developed from headline rates to more detailed information about the type and nature of contributions made by different groups of people (for the UK Mohan, 2011; Mohan, Twigg, Jones, Steve, & Barnard, 2006). Only recently research has been started on motivations for and effects of volunteering on volunteers and on society, with a particular emphasis on associated stimulating effects with regard to social innovation (but related preceding research dates back decades; see, for instance, Kendall, 2009 on the work of Beveridge).

In order to provide a first outline of how welfare and economic contexts influence third sector involvement and civic engagement in relation to social innovation, we draw on the Social Origins Theory, which provides an immediate link to such constellations. To account for differences in the service function and the advocacy function of non-profits cross-nationally, Salamon and Anheier have examined standard third sector theories (Anheier, 2005; Anheier, 2010; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). The authors found that none of the pre-existing theories explained the variations in the non-profit sector. The reason was found to lie in the simplistic assumptions of economic approaches and in the state-centeredness of conventional welfare literature (Salamon & Anheier, 1998).

To advance our knowledge on the role the third sector plays in nation states, Salamon and Anheier have developed the Social Origins Theory. It follows Esping-Andersen's (1990) argument that complex social phenomena such as the welfare state evolve in a historical process which is strongly influenced by power relations. In these power relations it is not only the state that plays a role but also the social forces of non-profits (Anheier, 2005). Therefore, they modify the theory of welfare regimes by explicitly incorporating the non-profit sector and relating third sector size to social welfare spending of the state. As a result, four types of non-profit regimes can be distinguished: liberal, social-democratic, corporatist, and statist (Anheier, 2010; Salamon & Anheier, 1998).

The foregoing suggests that we are able to display a major empirical outline (size and scope, revenue, numbers of volunteers) of the third sector across different countries. What is more, we can establish relationships between the size of the sector (be it measured in the number of third sector organisations, their relative share in government's welfare spending, the sector's relative contribution to GDP, or the share of third sector employees in total national workforce) and government social spending (mainly on, but not limited to the fields of health care, social care, education, and research). Table 1 shows how the countries that are part of ITSSOIN can be classified according to the social origins approach.

Table 1. Government spending – Scale of non-profit sector

	Government social spending LOW	*Government social spending* HIGH
Scale of third sector SMALL	**Statist** *(Czech Republic)*[2]	**Social democratic** Sweden, Denmark, *(Spain)*, (Italy 1998)[3]
Scale of third sector LARGE	**Liberal** United Kingdom	**Corporatist** France, Germany, Italy (2010), (*Netherlands)*

Based on (Anheier, 2005; Anheier, 2010; Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004)

A major critique of the classification approach recognised early on by Anheier is the difficulty to test this approach empirically, which is due to the necessity of qualitative judgments about the relative power constellations involved. In addition, the categories are to be understood as 'archetypes' that might exist in mixed form (Anheier, 2005). It has been suggested that an in-depth analysis of the current policy environment in the countries should be considered in order

[2] For the countries in italics and brackets no indication could be found in existing publications. They had originally been allocated as a 'best guess'. In the following we have performed a broader data collection effort, gathering data on indicators that can potentially be used for this classification.

[3] Italy is the only case of a country with data availability that has switched its position, when publications are compared. The figure in brackets indicates the year of the respective source, not of the actual year of data this refers to (the same applies to the table below).

to advance the classification (Anheier, 2010). Providing solutions to both of these challenges is an essential component of the ITSSOIN project. Guided by field theory, the qualitative judgment of power relations can be addressed by the yet to be performed in-depth case studies and an in-depth policy analysis regarding the connection between roles and positioning of the third sector with reference to social innovation (this will be outlined in the outlook chapter of this document). Against this background we expect to be able to considerably advance the knowledge on both the quantitative and the qualitative account of the third sector.

Starting from the classification above, we can also establish a relationship between sector scale and civic engagement (Table 2).

Table 2. Scale of third sector – Civic engagement

	Importance of civic engagement SMALL	*Importance of civic engagement* LARGE
Scale of third sector Small[4]	Czech Republic, Spain, (Italy 1998)	Sweden, Denmark
Scale of third sector Large	Germany, France, Italy (2010)	Netherlands, United Kingdom

Based on (Anheier, 2010; Hodgkinson, 2003)[5]

Although it is informative, this presentation reveals several gaps: the dates of the sources used to compile these tables, a task that has been performed in proposing the ITSSOIN project, indicate that the data have to be updated and complemented (since targeted accounts of some of the countries are missing or are vague). A renewed data gathering not only serves to keep figures up to date, but also helps detect new constellations and thus temporal developments in the welfare landscape by detecting the major shifts rather than evanescent changes in the positioning of countries. Accounts of such (re)positioning are crucial for judging the likely influence on social innovation by third sector organisations embedded in specific welfare constellations. The comparison of classifications based on publications from the year 1998 and 2010 (Anheier, 2010; Salamon & Anheier, 1998) shows that the allocation is quite stable. But when we observe Italy over time, for instance, we can see that its positioning changed from social democratic to corporatist, since the scale of the non-profit sector is supposed to have grown from small to large. While social democratic and corporatist states have high social welfare expenditures, social democratic states tend to deliver social welfare services directly, without 'outsourcing' them to third sector organisations which would thereby receive a corporatist negotiation position. Therefore, high social expenditures in combination with a large nonprofit sector qualify countries as corporatist. Such and other (opposed) shifts are likely to be detectable if we compare and update data more extensively.

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[4] The same lack of data with regard to third sector size as in the table below, but figures on volunteering were available for all countries, which is why none of the countries are marked in brackets (to avoid repetition of the above).

[5] Figures on volunteering as percentage of adult population. We will use share of volunteers in relation to paid workforce in third sector organisations later on. Volunteering figures for the Netherlands are very close to the median of compared countries with a tendency towards large.

What we seek to explore is the connection between conceptual accounts as well as empirical portraits of the third sector and social innovation: more precisely, the third sector's extent and form, with a particular emphasis on the conditions for social innovation as a driving force of societal renewal, cohesion, and sustainability. Table 3 establishes a basic set of corresponding expectations which will be developed and expanded in relation to the social origins theory in the following section.

Table 3. Connection to the degree of social innovation

	Civic Engagement SMALL	*Civic Engagement* LARGE
Scale of third sector SMALL	Social innovation **Smallest**	Social innovation **Medium**
Scale of third sector LARGE	Social innovation **Medium**	Social innovation **Highest**

As mentioned above, third sector organisations are positioned to be 'better' at social innovation than markets or the public sector. Indeed, social innovation is hypothesised as a main impact of the third sector on socio-economic development. In this context, we want to empirically test the socially innovative contributions of the third sector and the key role of civic engagement in particular.

We propose these relations between sector size, civic engagement and social innovation, since small civic engagement implies a relatively low level of new ideas developed by the inhabitants of a nation state. In combination with a small non-profit sector implying little opportunities to enact the ideas, social innovation is expected to be smallest. With a larger scale of the non-profit sector and therefore more opportunities for participation, medium innovative capacity is expected for countries with small civic engagement. In contrast, large civic engagement results in a higher probability that new ideas will develop. Where the non-profit sector is small, opportunities for putting novel ideas into practice are equally small. Again, in this case the probability of social innovations is medium. If there is large civic engagement and a large scale of a non-profit sector, social innovations are assumed to be highest. However, in order to have a valid assessment of countries (at least one that can be used to build hypotheses which are then to be tested), we have to update and double-check the social origins classification. This will be done in the next chapter.

What is more, there are alternative welfare and economic system classifications which are of importance to social innovation in the third sector and consequently need considering. In the following chapters we will therefore shed light on the question: how can alternative country-specific classifications of welfare systems and national political economies, which affect the third sector and civic engagement, be made use of in the analysis of social innovation in these countries?

By adopting this research approach, we do not imply linear relations between conditional factors and social innovation and we acknowledge that the practice of social innovation is more complex, contingent, and diverse than classifications suggest. However, we are convinced that if the underlying hypothesis of ITSSOIN is true, this will not only be reflected at the level of specific social innovations, but also at the more abstract level of political, economic, and organisational ecologies. The case-based but structurally embedded empirical testing of the proposed hypotheses will serve for verifying or falsifying these assumptions.

4. Updated cross-national contours of the third sector

Scope of social welfare and scale of third sector

In searching for data on the third sector, the strong influence of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project on the global third sector research has been helpful. Nevertheless, only a few countries have produced data that are comparable over time and in many of these countries the last data updating was more than ten years ago. This makes it difficult to provide meaningful comparisons, since data for different countries refer to different points in time. Nevertheless, structural and economic data with a separate analysis of civic engagement enable a country specific description of the third sector.

Originally it was planned to fill data gaps that could be identified. However, in parallel to ITSSOIN the 'Third Sector Impact' project (http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/) surveys the third sector from a predominantly economic and quantitative perspective. To avoid that the same research efforts are done twice, we decided to focus on the merging of up-to-date but readily available third sector data and conceptual insights in view of the resulting implications for social innovation.

Since the history and functions of the third sector vary between different countries, it must be highlighted that it is extremely difficult to make a relevant synthesis. One of the most serious problems is that we have data from different years. In the extreme cases there are 20 years between the newest and the oldest data sets. Nonetheless, these are, to the best of our knowledge, the latest and most fitting data available. To some extent newer data exist (for example from the ZIVIZ survey in Germany[6]), but if they do not appear in the analysis, it is because they did not match the particular dimensions explored below. This is why in some cases older but more fitting data were used. Although this means that the following analysis has to be read with caution, we are confident that given the variety of indicators included and the complementary perspectives provided in the next chapters, we can provide a meaningful indication of national variations affecting social innovation.

However, it is to be noted that the classification of countries in the ITSSOIN project, is performed in relative terms. If we were to increase the number of countries or the geographical scope (conducting an international study beyond Europe), we would possibly find medians and thus classification thresholds significantly altered. In contrast to the above cited standard classifications we have decided to regard the four-by-four tables rather as grids than as simple categories and will locate countries in this grid relative to each other, based on the combination and priority of indicators we apply in the following.

The first and indeed the most direct way to account for the **size of governmental social welfare spending** is to compare total national social expenditures.[7] This can be done per person or in relation to and thus as a share of GDP. The following tables give an overview of both perspectives.

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[6] See http://www.ziviz.info/, cf. References: Krimmer & Priemer, 2013a; Krimmer & Priemer 2013b
[7] Source OECD (2014)

Table 4. National social expenditures per person (in dollars)

Country	Social expenditures per person (2009) (US dollars)[8]
Czech Republic	4812
Spain	7328
United Kingdom	7762
Italy	7884
Germany	8017
Median	**8017**
Netherlands	8515
France	9232
Denmark	9861
Sweden	9890

Source: (OECD, 2014)

Table 5. National social expenditures as percentage of GDP

Country	Social expenditures in relation to GDP (2013) (%)
Czech Republic	22
United Kingdom	24
Netherlands	24
Germany	26
Spain	27
Median	**27**
Italy	28
Sweden	29
Denmark	31
France	33

Source: (OECD, 2014)

Some of the resulting indications are clear (Czech Republic-low; UK-low; Denmark-high; Sweden-high; France-high), whereas others are quite controversial: Italy and Spain (rather low, due to their below median position in expenditures per person), and Germany and the Netherlands (rather high, due to their above/at median position in the same regard). With respect to these four countries, however, it is to be remarked that the classification can be contested, which is why (but not the only reason) a third perspective might be consulted.

An alternative way of assessing social welfare spending and a way that is directly connected to the third sector, is to consider the variety of funding sources for the third sector across different countries. The following table (arranged according to the increasing share of public payments in third sector funding) demonstrates how third sector income arises from public payments, private giving and earned income (generated from the direct sales of goods or

[8] Figures given at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs (2000).

services to customers in mission-related or ancillary ways; also membership fees; see Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). This data is used to account for general government spending on social welfare: the share of government funding in the total income of the third sector is used as a proxy.[9] This share ranges from around 10 % in the UK to almost 70 % in Germany. We use the median of 31 % as a threshold to differentiate between a high level of social welfare spending by the state and a low level.

It has to be remarked that this third classifier of social welfare spending is the roughest of all three, since it will be directly affected by a country's underlying welfare ideology and tradition. Some countries are generally less likely to 'outsource' services to the third sector, no matter how high or low their total social welfare spending might be. Nonetheless, it can be useful as a complementary perspective.

Table 6. Third sector funding[10]

Country (year)	Public payments (%)	Private giving (%)	Earned income (%)
France			
United Kingdom (2012)	9	29	62
Italy (2011)	23	44	32
Sweden (1992)	29	12	60
Czech Republic (2011)	31	31	38
Median	**31**	**24**	**36**
Spain (1995)	32	19	49
Denmark (2004)	38	10	52
Netherlands (2002)	62	4	34
Germany (2011)[11]	66	12	21

Four distinct groups of third sector income are identifiable in the table: (a) balanced income from all three sources can be found in Czech Republic, Italy, and Spain; (b) high public payments, moderate earned income, and low private giving are found in Germany and the Netherlands; (c) high earned income which is accompanied in the UK by moderate private giving and low public payments; (d) in Sweden the high earned incomes are paired with moderate public payments and low private giving, while in Denmark lower but considerably high earned income is balanced with relatively high public payments and paired with low private giving.

To compare the alternative measures used for classification, the following table has been compiled indicating a country ranking per each of the dimensions.

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[9] Of course, the third sector does not represent all providers of welfare activities (as Table 8 on the share of third sector organisations in core welfare state funding will show). But if it is funded by the state, the funded activity will by definition be some sort of welfare activity (Salamon & Anheier, 1992a; Salamon & Anheier, 1992b), be it execution of its service or advocacy function.

[10] For this and all of the following tables data sources are listed in the appendix.

[11] For Germany, rather a representative survey of income sources than a comprehensive statistical account had to be used.

Table 7. Scope of social welfare – cross-national comparison

	Social expenditures per person (2009) (US dollars)[12]	Social expenditures in relation to GDP (2013) (%)	Public payments share of third sector funding (%)[13]
Low	Czech Republic	Czech Republic	United Kingdom (2012)
	Spain	United Kingdom	Italy (2011)
	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Sweden (1992)
	Italy	Germany	Czech Republic (2011)
Median	**Germany**	**Spain**	
	Netherlands	Italy	Spain (1995)
	France	Sweden	Denmark (2004)
	Denmark	Denmark	Netherlands (2002)
High	Sweden	France	Germany (2011)

In order to classify countries, the social expenditures per person were used as the primary classifier. The reason for this decision lies in the relative crudeness of the funding share criterion discussed earlier, but also in the bias that is potentially produced by differences in the size of national economies when expressing social expenditures as share of GDP. The stronger the respective economy and thus the larger the GDP, the harder it will be to arrive at a large share of social expenditures to GDP. Instead, the social expenditures *per* person are not influenced by country size and price changes or differences in living standards, because they are indicated in constant prices and PPPs from the year 2000. Therefore, this classifier seems to point in the least ambiguous direction. But overall a combination of all three classifiers is used for classification.

It is becoming evident that the overall classification is not straightforward, because for some countries mutually opposing evidence is found in comparing these figures. Yet, there are also some countries which can be allocated with quite great certainty and for some of them the classification seems clear (UK-low, Czech Republic-low, France-high, Denmark-high). For Sweden, however, figures have to be interpreted in favour of a dominant tendency (here: high; when putting greater emphasis on the first two indicators).

The third perspective (public payments share of third sector income) contributes to the analysis of the more controversial cases mentioned earlier, as it quite clearly helps placing the Netherlands and Germany in the larger and Italy in the smaller category. Spain remains most contested, but since it is considerably closer to the median in terms of funding shares than the other countries classified as large, its government social welfare spending is finally assessed as rather low.

The second important aspect with regard to the social origins theory is the **size of the third sector**. This aspect can be approached from several directions. As a first measure of third sector size, we may consider which share of state expenditures on core welfare state activities (health

[12] Figures given at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs (2000).
[13] France not included due to missing data.

care, social services, education, and research) flows into the third sector. This can be used as an estimate of its relative importance and thus of its comparative size. The third sector's share of expenditures on core welfare state activities ranges from about 30 % in Sweden to above 70 % in France. The median of the third sector share in expenditures on welfare state core activities is 58 %; as before, we will use this percentage as the threshold for classification into small and large scales.

Table 8. Share of third sector involved in welfare state core activities (health care, social services, education, and research)

Country (year)	Welfare state core activities expenditures - share of third sector[14] (%)
Czech Republic	n/a
Sweden (2002)	28
Denmark (2004)	46
Spain (2002)	46
Italy (2011)	55
Median	**58**
Netherlands (1995)	61
United Kingdom (2012)	61
Germany (2007)[15]	72
France (2002)	72

In general, we can state that the variation between our countries continues to be relatively large. Health care, social services, education, and research are thus important parts of the third sector in all these countries and, in fact, dominant in some of them.

According to the Social Origin Theory, the third sector's relative importance in a society can also be measured by its importance as a sphere of (professional) engagement for society or by the relationship between the non-profit sector and the economy. The third sector's importance measured by the size of paid labour, which we focus on first, is complemented in a second step by its economic size as measured by its share of GDP (Anheier, 2010).

If we compare the countries participating in the ITSSOIN project, the third sector share of the total economy's paid workforce (volunteers are excluded) is as in the following table. It is to be remarked that the relative uncertainty as to how the significance of volunteers in comparison to paid labour can be assessed and the consequential exclusion of volunteers in this comparison are slightly limiting the usefulness of this measure.

[14] Income figures are used for Italy.
[15] For Germany, third sector share in total national gross value added in these fields is used.

Table 9. Third sector share of paid workforce

Country (year)	Third sector share of paid workforce (% of total national workforce)	Change % (since year)
Czech Republic (2011)	2.0	+ 33 % (2005)
Sweden (2002)	2.7	+ 17 % (1992)
United Kingdom (2012)	2.7	+ 29 % (2002)
Denmark (2003)	3.9	
Spain (2002)	4.3	+ 5 % (1995)
Median	**4.3**	
Italy (2011)	4.6	+ 58 % (2001)
France (2011)	7.7	
Germany (2007)	9.2	+ 87 % (1995)
Netherlands (2002)	13	+ 9 % (1995)

The share of paid workforce varies considerably from 2 % in the Czech Republic to 13 % in the Netherlands, with a median of 4.3 %. The highest increase has taken place in Germany, followed by Italy.

The next table demonstrates the third sector share of GDP in the nine partner countries, which is an even less robust measure than is the workforce share. Its more limited robustness is due to the fact that this ranking only takes visible economic inputs and outputs into consideration, while other third sector contributions to the prosperity of a country remain invisible. However, since we perform this comparison in rather relative than absolute terms, third sector share of GDP is also a valid indicator. The potential, relative distortion produced by comparatively large economies and thus GDPs – with regard to social expenditures earlier referred to as a share of GDP – affects third sector shares of the GDP (which may be considerable in relation to single branches such as the automobile industry but small in relation to the whole of a national economy) in a similar way, which means that the third sector share is potentially disvalued.

Table 10. Third sector share of GDP

Country (year)	Third sector share of GDP (%)	Change % (since year)[16]
Czech Republic (2011)	1.6	+ 7 % (2005)
United Kingdom (2012)	2.4	+ 28 % (2002)
Denmark (2003)	2.6	
France (2002)	2.9	
Germany (2007)	4.1	+ 5 % (1995)
Median	**4.1**	
Italy (2011)	4.7	+ 42 % (2001)
Spain (2002)	4.7	+ 2 % (1995)
Sweden (2002)	5.3	+ 29 % (1992)
Netherlands (1995)	10	

The third sector size varies considerably, with shares of GDP from 1.6 % in the Czech Republic to 10 % in the Netherlands, and a median of 4.1 %. The highest increase has occurred in Italy.

The median of both presented measures shows that in the countries in question the third sector constitutes about 4 % of the total economy. However, the variation is very large ranging from less than half of the median to more than three times the median. An interesting observation is that all countries with at least two data points show an expansion of their third sectors in relation to their total economy in both of these measures.

Interestingly, Germany and Sweden show opposite tendencies when comparing their shares of GDP with their shares of paid workforce. In Sweden, the share of GDP is almost the double of the share of paid workforce, while in Germany, it is vice versa.

To illustrate this comparison more effectively and to merge the three perspectives applied, we provide a condensed version in the following table. Taking the above mentioned considerations on the robustness of the three measures into account, we prioritise them in the order listed below but try to base the classification on all three indicators as best as possible.

[16] We show changes over time for countries with at least two available data points.

Table 11. Scale of third sector – cross-national comparison

	Welfare state core activities expenditures - share of third sector[17]	Third sector share of paid workforce (%)	Third sector share of GDP (%)
Small	Sweden (2002)	Czech Republic (2011)	Czech Republic (2011)
	Denmark (2004)	Sweden (2002)	United Kingdom (2012)
	Spain (2002)	United Kingdom (2012)	Denmark (2003)
	Italy (2011)	Denmark (2003)	France (2002)
Median		**Spain (2002)**	**Germany (2007)**
	Netherlands (1995)	Italy (2011)	Italy (2011)
	United Kingdom (2012)	France (2011)	Spain (2002)
	Germany (1990)	Germany (2007)	Sweden (2002)
Large	France (2002)	Netherlands (2002)	Netherlands (1995)

Once again we find some clearly classifiable cases (Czech Republic-small, Netherlands-large) and some more cases that are unclear but show a distinct tendency (Germany-large, France-large, Denmark-small). The most controversial ones are Sweden (small; if we adhere to the proposed prioritisation of indicators), the UK (rather large; based on the same rationale), and Spain and Italy (rather small; based on the same rationale but with a more pronounced upward tendency for Italy, if all three dimensions are considered).

Following the social origins theory classification, the ITSSOIN countries can be clustered as follows.

[17] The Czech Republic not included due to missing data.

Table 12. Updated social origins classification[18]

	Government social spending[19] LOW	*Government social spending* HIGH
Scale of third sector[20] SMALL	**Statist** * Czech Republic Spain * Italy *	**Social democratic** Sweden * * Denmark
Scale of third sector LARGE	* UK **Liberal**	* Netherlands * Germany France * **Corporatist**

These classification examples have served to confirm the allocation for most countries but have also revealed latent contradictions arising from the applied classification criteria. Furthermore, the analysis has shown the relative instability, or rather the flexibility, of predefined types. Based on the measures of third sector size used here, the UK, for instance, could only just be categorised as liberal but is, in fact, fairly close to a statist country. On the other hand, in Spain, there is a moderate tendency towards a liberal state because of the (slowly) increasing size of the non-profit sector in relation to the economy and in combination with constantly rather low government expenditure on social welfare. More recent data would be needed to assess this situation, in particular with reference to the condition of Spain during and after the economic crisis. This becomes even more salient if we consider that in Spain the third sector itself seems to have grown, while paid labour in the third sector (as shown below) has declined, which illustrates the critical importance of civic engagement. However, what is most striking is

[18] All of the below relations are in relative and not in absolute terms.
[19] Government social welfare spending is measured by social expenditures per person, then by share of social expenditures of GDP and third by the share of government funding in third sector total income.
[20] Scale of the third sector is measured primarily by engagement in welfare activities, then by share of paid national workforce and third by share of GDP.

the constant reallocation of Italy, which is due to the most irregular indication provided by the applied indicators. This might also point to shifting trajectories, which are, for instance, further indicated by the increase of the third sector share of GDP from 2001 to 2012 by 42 per cent. In fact, Italy could be quite easily placed in the social democratic or even the corporatist category, because its figures are rather close to the median (in two out of three cases per each of the dimensions: social expenditures and third sector size), which points at a varying position in terms of classification.

The scope of volunteering

When recalling the main hypothesis formulated within the ITSSOIN project, we will have to consider the influence of civic engagement in addition to the structural perspective outlined above. The workforce in (larger) third sector organisations often involves paid employees and volunteers. It is therefore the best estimate we have when assessing the importance of volunteering and thus civic engagement more broadly. The distribution of these different types of labour is shown in the table below.

Table 13. Distribution of third sector workforce[21]

Country (year)	Paid employees (%)	Volunteers (%)	Change paid employees % (since year)
Czech Republic (2011)	79	21	+ 18 % (2005)
France*	65	35	
Germany (1995)	62	38	
Netherlands (1995)	62	38	
Spain (2002)	59	41	- 9 % (1995)
Median	**59**	**41**	
Denmark (2004)	56	44	
Italy*	55	45	
United Kingdom*	50	50	
Sweden (2002)	22	78	+- 0 % (1992)

* Country data is based on estimates in unpublished material.[22]

Once again the variation between different countries is large. The share of volunteers varies from about 20% in the Czech Republic to almost 80 % in Sweden, with a median of around 40 %.

[21] Both figures indicated in full-time equivalents, not headcounts.
[22] Cf. https://iave.org/sites/default/files/PPT-Lester_Salamon.pdf (presentation from 2011, no dates for data indicated) & http://www.socialeconomy.eu.org/IMG/pdf/2004_04_23_EN_EV_Ann10_salamon-ppt2-en.pdf (presentation from 2004, no dates for data indicated). These data are partly in contrast to our accounts of third sector share in paid workforce (for instance, in table 9, our figure for employed work in Germany is 9.2 %, whereas the more recent of the two above mentioned sources provides only 6.8 % for employed and volunteer labour together). This is obviously due to temporal shifts and partly due to differences in underlying definitions, but we might at least assume that the relation between paid and volunteer work is less subject to moderations than the accuracy of the absolute figures.

Synthesis

If we now combine this ranking of civic engagement with the structural size of the third sector in the countries that we have assessed previously, we get the following categorisation.

Table 14. Aggregated social innovativeness[23]



Generally we see that the new classification confirmed the initial positioning, with one of the exceptions being Italy: its changed classification is mainly due to its repositioning in terms of volunteering. The increased degree of civic engagement found in the publication from 2010 (Anheier, 2010) in comparison to the publication from 1998 (Salamon & Anheier, 1998), has been confirmed by our data. However, although the sector has grown, in comparison to other countries it is still considered to be rather small. In Spain, a similar shift with regard to volunteering was detected. Once again this points to Italy and Spain as interesting cases when tracking significant trajectories.

An additional change has occurred in the allocation of the Netherlands: in comparison to other countries, the share of volunteers in relation to paid labour in third sector organisations is

[23] All of the below relations are in relative and not in absolute terms.
[24] Scale of the third sector is measured primarily by engagement in welfare activities, then by share of paid national workforce and third by share of GDP.

proportionately lower than the share of volunteers in the general adult population (as reported in Hodgkinson, 2003). This shift in the assessment has led to an estimation of a rather medium than high social innovation potential. In general, this might be levelled out by the exceptionally high proportion of third sector workforce (be it paid employees or volunteers) in comparison to other countries. Generally dated figures are to be treated with caution, which applies to some of the cases at hand in lack of more recent data.

In addition to this, it has to be kept in mind that also the allocation of Spain and the UK are disputable. Spain is on the brink of being classified as having both a large third sector and high civic engagement, since it is in both regards close to or at the median. Although Spain's civic engagement is at the median (in equal distance to the next lower and higher positioned country), it has been classified as low, because in comparison to 1995, in 2002 paid employment has decreased by 9 %. In combination with an increasing share in GDP (plus 2 %) and an increasing share of total employed workforce (plus 5 %), this rather points at a relative decline of the for-profit economy than a substantial increase in third sector capacity. Although we lack specific data, an increased degree of civic engagement is unlikely, if paid employee rates have declined. A different allocation, however, would change the estimate of Spain's social innovation potential. If the UK third sector was assessed as comparatively small (for instance in relation to its contribution to GDP), there would be no country fulfilling the criteria of high social innovation potential.

Despite these limitations, we can summarise some essential third sector characteristics across the different countries as follows:

- The Czech Republic has a small third sector with balanced funding and a high degree of paid employees. Social innovation potential is low.

- Spain has a small to moderate-sized third sector with balanced funding. The third sector engages to a moderate degree in core welfare state activities and has moderate degrees of paid employees and volunteers. Social innovation potential is low.

- Italy has a small to moderate-sized third sector which is highly engaged in core welfare state activities, has a balanced funding and moderate to high level of volunteer engagement. Social innovation potential is medium.

- Denmark has a moderate-sized third sector with balanced funding and moderate degrees of core welfare state activities and volunteers. Social innovation potential is medium.

- Sweden has a moderate-sized third sector with high earned income, moderate public payments and low private giving. The third sector has a relatively low involvement in core welfare state activities and has very high level of volunteer engagement. Social innovation potential is medium.

- France has a large third sector that is highly engaged in core welfare state activities but with relatively low volunteer engagement. Social innovation potential is medium.

- Germany has a large third sector with high public funding, moderate earned income, a small degree of private giving and has moderate degrees of paid employees and volunteers. Social innovation potential is medium.

- The Netherlands have a large third sector with high public funding, moderate earned income and a small degree of private giving. The third sector is highly active in core welfare state activities and has a moderate level of volunteer engagement. Social innovation potential is medium.

- The United Kingdom has a large third sector which is highly engaged in core welfare state activities with high earned income, moderate private giving and low public payments. Volunteer engagement is also high. Social innovation potential is high.

Although the social origins classification gives us some lead as to where most social innovations can be expected, it will be useful to draw on alternative classifications, which provide implications for social innovation and can provide other sorts of rationales to complement our reasoning, just as initially proposed. It might well prove that it is the combination of structural, engagement, and framework factors that triggers social innovation. The inclusion of additional rationales is particularly necessary due to the uncovered ambiguities in classification and the wide range of medium social innovation potential, where third sector size and volunteer engagement partly balance each other out.

5. The use of welfare state and economic classifications in studying social innovation

As already mentioned, the Social Origins Theory most explicitly lends itself to assess the question as to where the third sector is to be positioned with reference to social innovation. But since the third sector never exists in isolation and since it is the interplay of sectors and actors that offers the highest explanatory potential in regard to the emergence of social innovation, we need to expand our analysis.

To assess the postulated research objectives, we have to consider a variety of moderators affecting social innovation from several directions. Apart from the social origins theory, we will also have to examine more fundamental principles of the welfare state coined in the 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism'. The dimensions applied by Esping-Andersen (1990) such as 'decommodification' (as a proxy for market pressures) and 'stratification' (as a proxy for social pressures) are relevant both to the policy affecting social innovation and the type and strength of social innovation that is likely to evolve in the specific welfare state context. The classification has a focus on state provision in relation to social constellations and market logics.

What is more, there is an increasing interest in classifying the varieties of capitalism and how they affect the nature of innovation which is likely to evolve, ranging from incremental to more radical sorts of innovation (Hall & Soskice, 2001). This classification is focussed on economies in relation to state involvement. We assume that the economic system will affect the sort of social innovation which is to emerge in the different countries. As further related to this, we suspect that it is not only the *sort* of innovation (radical versus incremental) that is moderated, but also the focus on innovation *types* as classified in our review of innovation literature that differentiates technological, governance and social innovation (Anheier & Krlev, 2014a).

According to what we have learned about innovation policies (Ramstad, 2009), a country with a more 'radical innovation' is likely to have a more technology focused innovation policy, which is meant to foster and enhance innovation in a controlled and forceful way, whereas a country with a more 'incremental innovation' might be rather oriented towards participation and civic involvement and thus a more natural and bottom-up evolvement of social innovation, which was found to be favourable in relation to the sustainability of social innovation.

For similar reasons these approaches have been recently used in a welfare state based perspective on hybridity with regard to the question as to how policy reforms and streams as well as welfare traditions affect the viability of hybrid organisations (Anheier & Krlev, 2014b). Although we propose that hybridity and innovation are closely related (Anheier & Krlev, 2014a), particularly in terms of the field characteristics which they are most likely to occur in (complexity and dynamism), the view we take on welfare regimes here is distinct, since it is used to derive targeted implications on social innovation streams and policies as related to national welfare conceptions. Moreover, we now consider a different and larger set of countries and provide detailed insights from an exclusively European perspective.

Since the Social Origins Theory in combination with figures on civic engagement corresponds best to the investigation at hand, we have focussed on it in our empirical data collection. Another reason is that shifts in the social origins classifiers are more likely to be subject to dynamic developments than fundamental shifts in the welfare regime classifiers to be discussed below. Furthermore, we have quite recent data on varieties of capitalist economies. Therefore, we used the existing data on the two latter concepts (welfare regimes and varieties of capitalism), whereas we presented an update on the social origins related classifications. A comparative discussion on insights arising from all three classifications combined will follow in the next chapter. In addition to formulating macro-level hypotheses with the objective of explaining cross-national variation in social innovation (presented in the document that summarises ITSSOIN's hypotheses), this discussion will help select the countries for case studies on social innovations, since criteria for particularly insightful cross-national comparisons can be identified in the discussion to follow.

Welfare regimes

Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of welfare states is a cross-national approach. He uses the typology as an approximation to illustrate the relation between the state, the economy, and the welfare regime in nation-states by differentiating the logic of organisation, stratification, and societal integration for each state. He identifies three types of welfare-states. This typology is to be regarded as a compensatory theory, because a complete theory cannot be formulated for the young discipline of comparative macro-sociology of welfare states (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Baum-Ceisig, Busch, Hacker, & Nospickel, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 1990).

To understand why three qualitatively different welfare-state logics exist, Esping-Andersen examines historical and political forces. He differentiates welfare regimes using three interconnected factors: class mobilisation, class political action, and historical legacy of regime institutionalisation. The three types of welfare state – liberal, conservative, and social-democratic – can be differentiated by their degree of decommodification, meaning 'the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 37). Several dimensions are relevant to measuring the degree of decommodification, including: rules that govern peoples' access to social benefits, and social protection against the basic social risks (Bonoli, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 47). The dimension of stratification, on the other hand, refers to '[…] the articulation of social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 55). The level of corporatism, poor relief expenditures or the share of private pensions and private health spending are some of the variables included in the assessment of stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 70f.).

Criticism levelled at this approach concerns the empirical evidence that supports the typology. It is claimed (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996) that, either resulting from the selection of countries or the selection of variables, there is an insufficient reflection on Mediterranean countries or the Antipodes (Australia or New Zealand).

In several studies that compare welfare regimes similarly to Esping-Andersen, the Mediterranean countries in Europe are understood as a separate model. Criteria supporting this thesis of a fourth type of welfare regime are the relative lack of an articulated social minimum and a right to welfare, on the one hand (Leibfried, 1992), and some generous benefit levels and an institutionalised right of health care as part of the right of citizenship, on the other (Ferrera, 1996). It is uncertain whether Esping-Andersen's original classification really has to be complemented, but empirical data on Mediterranean countries support this claim (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). With reference to the Antipodes, which Esping-Andersen allocates to the liberal type, appreciation of their more inclusive approach to social protection, which could be accounted for by social spending as an indicator for income distribution (cf. Castles, 1999), is called for. Similarly, Korpi and Palme include old age pensions and sickness cash benefits in their analysis, arguing that they are at the heart of the welfare state (Korpi & Palme, 1998). Using these measurements they confirm the regimes differentiated by Esping-Andersen but add two more (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). Finally, a gender analysis suggests that gender differences need to be taken into account when analysing social policy, since these are important indicators of welfare and care for children and elderly people. In addition, the direct and indirect discrimination existing in nearly all states have to be considered (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Baum-Ceisig et al., 2008).

With reference to Europe, the question as to how the typology applies to post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe is crucial. The study of Baum-Ceisig et al. on Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Romania, show that the existing types of welfare regimes have explanatory potential and that these countries can be allocated to them. First of all, due to their high degree of variation, not all of these countries can be integrated into a single category, namely a post-socialist welfare state. Second, some do not fully correspond to any of the ideal types, but evolvements with a more or less clear direction can be detected (Baum-Ceisig et al., 2008). Besides, non-conformity to an ideal type is not only characteristic of Eastern European states.

Despite the ongoing discussion of 'unclear' and hybrid cases (Amable, 2003; Arts & Gelissen, 2002), there is a fairly broad agreement on ideal types. Authors argue that involving too many variables would decrease the explanatory power. Following this argumentation, the ITSSOIN project draws on the typology of liberal, conservative, and social-democratic states (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) but adds the type of 'post-socialist' regimes (Baum-Ceisig et al., 2008). On the basis of variations from low to high stratification and decommodification, the ITSSOIN countries can be classified as follows:

Table 15. Decommodification and stratification[25]

	Decommodification Low	*Decommodification* High
Stratification Low	**Conservative** Italy, France, Germany, *(Spain)*	**Social-democratic** Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden
Stratification High	**Liberal** United Kingdom	***(Post-socialist)*** *(Czech Republic)*

(Based on Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990)

This classification allows for judging characteristics of social innovations and the policies accompanying them. The degree of stratification gives an estimate of inequality in the society and may thus serve as a proxy for solidarity, the involvement of civic engagement, and the third sector more generally in social innovation. (De)commodification can serve as an estimate of the influence of market forces on social innovation.

If we combine these two dimensions, we can postulate the following traits of social innovation fields: where social welfare is quite highly commoditised (decommodification is low) and thus market influence moderate to high and stratification is low and thus solidarity influence high, it is likely that social innovation will be driven by civic engagement but also regulated by (quasi-)markets that exert market pressures and are regulated by the state. Pure market influence will be more extreme in countries where stratification is high, indicating a large heterogeneity in the population and a difficulty to uniformly mobilise civil society uniformly, thus giving it little direct control over markets and little indirect control via state directives in favour of civic participation. Social innovation in such a setting will be driven by single and powerful, market oriented entities and supported by similar policies that stimulate investment rather than state funding and regulation. In contrast, where decommodification is high and stratification low, social innovation can be either cared for by community initiatives in isolation of market or state pressures where regulation is unnecessary or not well established, or be provided by the state where broad social consensus, voter support, and policy priorities coincide. Finally, where both decommodification and stratification are high, neither civil society nor the market will promote social innovation. It will be dependent on isolated state influence and thus only pronounced where state capacity is high but even then focused on fields with policy priority (potentially direct by the median voter theorem). This comes along with a relative neglect of fields with lower political status.

Following the logic proposed by ITSSOIN that both civic involvement and a relative absence of market pressures and state coercion[26] are most favourable for social innovation (Anheier et al., 2014), it is likely to be most pronounced (frequent *and* substantial *and* sustainable) in states which are located at the intersection of the conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes

[25] Again, there was no data available on the countries in brackets. There, the allocation is therefore an approximation.
[26] In relation to the above, state coercion is likely where decommodification and stratification are high; but other moderators will also be laid out in relation to national political economies, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

(low stratification and moderate decommodification). This must not necessarily be congruent with policy rhetoric but is likely to be reflected in citizen and media perceptions and should evolve against in-depth empirical research of social innovation.

If we consider the countries at hand and involve the previous rationales provided by the social origins theory, the Netherlands are a particularly interesting case, being closest to the brink of high social innovation potential in the previous classification and fairly close to the conservative regime in terms of less pronounced decommodification (as compared to Sweden or Denmark, yet at a generally high level) (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Other potentially interesting cases in this classification in combination with a medium social innovation potential that was assessed earlier, are Sweden and Denmark (with a hint given by the high civic engagement) or Germany (with a hint provided by the well-established and large third sector structures). In this constellation, the United Kingdom would lose its distinct and solitary role and, indeed, potentially fall back behind other countries. However, this picture may change, if we further consider potentially relevant economic moderators.

Varieties of Capitalism

The 'Varieties of Capitalism' (VoC) approach of Hall and Soskice claims that two types of market economies that dominate nation states can be differentiated. This typology is developed by the authors to identify important patterns of similarities and differences across nations. At the same time, it should help shed light on the processes in which national political economies change. The authors originally developed the 'Varieties of Capitalism' approach to account for coordination problems faced by firms with regard to the interaction of a wide range of actors cross-cutting the spheres of industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and employee recruitment and management. For Hall and Soskice, the typology of market economies is only a first step in the identification of conditions in which firms operate and allows for systematic cross-national comparisons of broader institutional settings (Hall & Soskice, 2001).

Third sector organisations on the country level are embedded in the same institutional settings as firms; their innovative capacity can therefore be expected to be affected in a similar way by their positioning relative to the varieties in capitalist political economies. Thus, the insights provided by the approach and related studies can, in general, be transferred to the third sector. This applies not only to the nature of emergent social innovation (radical versus incremental social innovation), but also to the policy environment in which social innovations are embedded and/or more likely to strive: a more participatory and regulated, and thus transient environment taking up new streams and transforming them into policies and legislation *versus* a perceptibly freer but more pressed environment – pressed in terms of market forces and in terms of funding and fostering logics behind innovation, for instance with comparatively heavy investment into few selected players (in analogy to some technological innovation policies).

Based on differing institutional conditions that imply sector specific advantages and disadvantages for companies and countries, Hall and Soskice have proposed two main types of capitalist varieties. Although firms are expected to strategically cope with these conditions, the authors expect that strategies (will have to) follow the given national structure. National systems thereby partly pervert the organisational logic of 'structure follows strategy' (Chandler, 1962) and represent a more or less rigid framework that firms have to adapt to. Although not entirely true, we can expect firms that inhabit an environment favourable to the aspect in question to find it easier to thrive in this respect than firms that face a less favourable or different environment in their national context. In view of our research focus, it is of significant importance that these conditions are hypothesised to strongly influence innovation opportunities (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2006).

For Hall and Soskice, the main defining variable of innovative capacity is the private sector's ability to act (in)dependently from government influence. Liberal market economies (LME) are seen as relatively free from state influences. They are characterised by institutional hierarchies and competitive market arrangements that, so the authors assert, favour radical innovations. Coordinated market economies (CME) on the other end of the spectrum depend more on non-market relationships that are collaborative and use strategic interaction. Here, state influence on the private sector is stronger and this is believed to support incremental innovation. Empirically, the authors compare the variables of employment protection and stock market capitalisation of a multitude of countries from the 1960s to the late 1990s. The results of their analysis confirm the assumption that countries build clusters which can be typified as LME and CME (Hall & Soskice, 2001).

The characteristics of LMEs and CMEs imply that their institutional settings vary significantly. Hall and Soskice assume the implementation of coordinated policies or coordinated investments to be more difficult in LMEs than in CMEs, since the structural connections of actors do not link together and their cultures do not provide a neat fit (Hall & Soskice, 2001). This is supported by studies by Franzese, Thelen and Wood who show how policy dynamics (concentrated on labour policies), business policies, and monetary policies differ systematically in LMEs and CMEs (Franzese, 2001; Thelen, 2001; Wood, 2001). In addition, trespassing the economic sphere, the type of welfare state is seen as corresponding to characteristics of the economy. The findings of Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice as well as those of Mares support the hypothesis that LMEs are likely to be embedded in liberal welfare states, whereas welfare states of CMEs are more state centred (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mares, 2001), yet with the question remaining as to whether they are to be interpreted as rather corporatist or social democratic.

Schneider and Paunescu (2012) tested the theory of Hall and Soskice with longitudinal data, arguing that such evidence of the 'Varieties of Capitalism' approach was missing.27 Thereby, they focus on comparative advantages in various sectors rather than on technological advantages. Schneider and Paunescu partly arrive at the same results as Hall and Soskice but also find changes in response to time. On the one hand, they identify 'hybrid countries' that are located between the two poles outlined by Hall and Soskice and find themselves in a process of ongoing transformation. On the other hand, they identified membership of countries in clusters that are in conflict with the Hall and Soskice analysis. Finally, they introduced a third cluster of 'LME-like' countries (Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). As a further complement to the existing typology King finds that post-socialist countries are neither uniformly LME nor CME, but vary in their outfit and thus in the allocation to types of capitalism (King, 2007). In accordance with this, Feldman (2007) describes LME-type configurations in Estonia and CME-

[27] The authors use data from the years 1990, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2005.

type outfits in Slovenia, and Mykhnenko (2007) identifies mixed or weak CMEs in Poland and Ukraine. This underlines the necessity of a differentiated look as these typologies.

Given this background information, let us transfer these insights to the third sector: at a general level we can hypothesise that the more liberal market economy contexts are, the more likely will third sector organisations trigger radical change, whereas incremental change effectuated by the third sector organisations is more likely in coordinated market economies. At a more abstract level LMEs are more likely to be dominated by single players and collectivism will be less pronounced, bearing negative effects for civic involvement and bottom-up development. However, since the latter were found to be traits of social innovation (Anheier et al., 2014), social innovation tendencies may be generally stronger (or at least more sustainable) in CME-type countries. The same reasoning applies to the fact that social innovations are more likely to evolve in a lengthier but more democratic process and respective policies are more likely in CMEs, while social innovations are more likely to be pushed and controlled with greater force in LME countries in analogy to technological innovation policy. If we take into account the coercive effects a high degree of state directedness might have on the ability of civil society to evolve and blossom, we have forces that drive social innovation potential towards the middle of the spectrum. Thereby, it seems more unlikely that countries in a hybrid state (which might be connected to insecurity and transition) will be distinctly innovative. Finally, the LME-like countries can possibly combine relative freedom and solidarity to trigger social innovation.

In order to account for a greater range of typology groups, we use the work of Schneider and Paunescu to classify the ITSSOIN countries according to the varieties of capitalism approach in the next table.

Table 16. State versus market dominance

State (-dominated)			Market(-dominated)
Incremental Innovation			Radical Innovation
←			→
CME	Hybrids	LME-like	LME
Germany, France	Italy, Czech Republic	Spain, Netherlands, Sweden	Denmark, United Kingdom

(Based on Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012)

Jackson and Deeg (2006) have criticised that the static focus of the approach does not allow for tracing endogenous dynamics. To become visible in the model, change has to happen in form of major endogenous or exogenous shocks but a general shift from CME to LME is unlikely (Hancké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007), which makes it hard to identify and track trajectories. This critique has partly been met by the time series comparison provided by Schneider and Paunescu (2012).

The VoC approach has further been criticised for not sufficiently incorporating political struggles and the specific role of the state (Hancké et al., 2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2006; Wood, 2001). Amable (2003) attempted to extend the approach by differentiating five institutional areas: product-market competition, wage-labour nexus and labour-market institutions, financial intermediation and corporate governance, social protection and the welfare state, and the educational sector. We adopt a similarly broad view with regard to social innovation by combining a variety of classifications to assess countries' socially innovative capacity.

If we thus finally merge all rationales previously provided, there are two countries that emerge from our combined reasoning: the Netherlands and Sweden. In addition to structural, engagement-based, and welfare characteristics, economic (policy) features point at their potential for social innovation. In this merged picture Germany, Denmark, and the UK fall relatively behind. What is more, the latter countries have been generally more stable in their economies' classification as shown by the trajectories drawn by Schneider and Paunescu (2012). The Netherlands and Sweden, for instance, have made a transition from CME in 1990 to LME-like in 2005. This points at a more dynamic development in the countries and if we link dynamism back to innovation (Anheier & Krlev, 2014a), at a higher social innovation potential.

Against this background, another country emerges that has not been on our agenda to date: Spain. The transformation it has made over the last two decades is even more extreme than the one of Sweden and the Netherlands. From a 'state-dominated country' (a category which we have left out in the above table, because of its present irrelevance to the classification of ITSSOIN countries) it has developed to an LME-like country and has undergone a sudden change in classification from 2003 to 2005 (Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). It has been mentioned earlier that the classification of Spain in the previous approaches has partly been difficult due to its proximity to the median used for categorisation. If other criteria or thresholds were applied, we could regard its socially innovative potential as higher. Combined with this reasoning on the varieties of capitalism this has significant implications for an increased relevance to social innovation.

Finally, and by far not least, Spain possesses a critical feature that has been entirely disregarded in this analysis, which has focused on capacity rather than necessity. It is generally agreed that Spain has suffered significantly from the effects of the economic crisis and it remains an open question whether social innovation is more strongly influenced by the abundance of resources or their scarcity (Dahl et al., 2014). Thus, particularly in relation to the acuteness of social needs in combination with a comparatively weaker, yet sufficiently strong infrastructures and degrees of engagement, Spain is a very interesting case for studying social innovation.

6. Discussion – gained insights and remaining gaps

It has been shown that taking into account temporal developments in the classification of countries across authors as well as a comparative analysis of VoC to welfare classifications and the uncovering of contradictory implications can prove useful when studying social innovation. Of course, we cannot account for social innovation potential holistically in the research to be performed within the ITSSOIN project and an effort to do so will have to take a higher variety of aspects into account (Krlev et al., 2014). But uncovering dominant innovation streams and how and which actors have been involved in them across countries (with some, yet qualitative indication of frequencies, strength of involvement, trajectories, time lags, or the absence of innovation) is likely to prove useful against this classification of countries and estimates of which role social innovation is likely to play within them. By the specific tracking of changes and shifts by means of qualitative in-depth analysis of social innovations, we will not only be able to contribute to the understanding of the latter, but also move from a static to a dynamic analysis that allows to interconnect welfare and economic contexts in order to provide a broader view on innovation developments.

This theoretical and empirical evaluation leads to insights into cross-country comparisons that are especially promising in order to gain such insights. The structural accounts just described will be complemented by further conditional factors, which will help confirm or contradict the underlying reasoning. A policy analysis on social innovation in relation to the role of the third sector will be performed (ITSSOIN work package 2). We will also look at public perceptions of these issues as reflected in the media and citizen attitudes assessed by surveys (also ITSSOIN work package 2). Finally, we will take a closer look on how volunteering plays an important role in the third sector and its distinct relation to social innovation (ITSSOIN work package 3).

In summary the present contribution has advanced two issues: we have presented an up-to-date picture of welfare and economic contexts in relation to social innovation and we have illustrated where contradictions occur across classifications and their implications for social innovation. This is a task that has contributed to the formation of hypotheses of conditional factors to social innovation.

It is not to be forgotten that the present analysis has focused on the macro level. As proposed earlier, it is, however, essential to take account of the field level in studying social innovation, since tendencies might counteract or level each other out at a higher level. All of the subsequent research will thus start from the conditional factors such as welfare regimes or political economies at the macro level and extend to more specific conditions at the field level. The fields we are interested in are: culture and arts, social services, health care, environmental sustainability, consumer protection, work integration, and community development.

Social innovation may markedly vary by field in light of the different configurations of welfare regimes or national economies. An example of a conditional factor in work integration is the rate of long-term unemployment. The greater this rate is, the more likely is a greater size of non-profit work integration programmes. Such conditions will be considered in relation to the variety of fields and assessed in compiling short country vignettes of the above fields across countries.

In order to arrive at a good coverage of the overall European diversity in terms of welfare concepts and capitalist variety, we will have to take both perspectives into account. The gained insights on the national level will therefore be also crucial in order to identify the most informative field-country combinations (these insights will form the fundamental rationale to identify contrasts and thus to follow the rationale of heterogeneity sampling Patton, 2002 or to identify similarities, both in terms of country traits and differences in estimated social innovation potential). The eventual analysis will be guided by a common research approach. The overarching framework for the analysis of case studies which depend on qualitative data on the interplay of a variety of factors will be briefly outlined in the following to provide an outlook on the research to follow.

7. Outlook – how to study social innovations at the field level

As introduced initially and repeated above, the preceding classifications were useful in determining conditioning factors for social innovativeness at the macro level. To perform the desired transition to the meso and micro level, we have to consider a methodological access that is capable of integrating all these levels.

This can be concluded from the ITSSOIN deliverable 1.1 (Anheier et al., 2014) that offered a review of innovation literature. This review not only showed that the national and regional territories influence innovation, as accounted for by the study of conditioning factors on national innovation systems, but also that also organisational settings and specific actors have to be taken into account. Social innovation involves multiple stakeholders and takes place in diverse social spheres.

Field theory as a deductive approach to the study of social innovations allows for the conceptual connection of different levels of analysis and offers a high degree of empirical openness, since a variety of research objects can be included. A field is constructed by a research object. The focus on the research object (here: social innovation) enables a description of environmental influences by using several simple assumptions. The underlying idea is that actors (here: third sector organisations, social entrepreneurs, or social movements, but also policy and firms) construct a field for their object of interest. They use the resources they have at their disposition (here: intrapreneurship and management) or mobilise new ones (here: entrepreneurship) to meet their interests. This may create conflicts in the field (here: incompatibility of social innovation with welfare or economic structures) but also unleash potential (here: addressing of social needs). The empirical description of such constellations additionally allows for a conceptual construction of field structures that consist of institutional settings and power relations. This fundamental step of analysis in field construction is described by various approaches to field theory (Bourdieu, 1993; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012a). Consequently, the main questions that have to be answered are: who are the relevant actors for the social innovation in question?; what are the interests these actors have with regard to the social innovation?; what actions do the field members undertake to meet these interests and which resources do they dedicate to these tasks?

Starting from the identification of dominant social innovation streams in the specific activity field (to be derived by expert consultations and snowball sampling), we will address these questions in relation to the characteristics of social innovations proposed previously (Anheier et al., 2014, pp. 33f.):

> *"First, their [social innovations'] motivational character is in the meeting of neglected social needs. Second, their underlying image of innovation is one that combines functionalist with transformationalist aspects. Third, their primary impact is on the well-being of the beneficiaries as well as the actors involved, the borders between which are reshuffled and blurred by the underlying mechanisms of social innovation. [...]Social innovations involve a higher degree of bottom-up and grass-roots involvement than other types of innovation. This can make their impact broader and more sustainable, but social innovations will typically take longer to evolve and sustain than other types of innovation. The most critical moderator (beyond the very survival of the innovation) will be their ability to gain legitimacy in a socially grounded negotiation process."*

Drawing on this, we aim to generate a description of the interest the field members have in social innovations, which includes their motivation, their image of innovation, and the primary impact they associate with the specific social innovation. The involvement of a multitude of actors we propose to study – with a particular emphasis on the role of third sector entities – contributes to the emergence of a common 'field logic' (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012b; Friedland & Alford, 1991). However, the interest of field members can also be conflicting, which is the case when fields are understood as grounds for battles between actors (Bourdieu, 1985). This is of particular relevance in view of the on-going discussion as to who the social innovators are and as to the complex legitimacy issues involved (Nicholls, 2010).

To account for the relations of field members, not only their (diverging) interests, but also their power relations are crucial (Bourdieu, 1993; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). The comparison of the role of incumbents and new challengers or collaborators provides, for instance, a high explanatory potential with reference to the research object (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) (here: the emergence of social innovation). Researchers assume that challengers are more likely to be interested in changes in the field, because this would improve their position in it (Fligstein, 1996, Fligstein, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). Here we find a parallel to social entrepreneurs as initiators of social innovation through maximising local network embeddedness to meet social needs, thereby building social credibility (Shaw & Carter, 2007).

What is more, the ability to foster social innovation as a means of enhancing social productivity may not only result in the production of different sorts of capital (Bourdieu, 1986), but also depend on the organisations' capacity to tap into them. Third sector actors may not generally possess a high level of economic capital but they can draw on other sorts of capital, for instance, on social (which is vital to the mobilisation of stakeholders) or cultural capital (values and virtues that are crucial for the ability to gain legitimacy). Through this, they may be overall more powerful than other actors such as the state or firms.

It should not be forgotten that fields are interconnected and can be constructed at different levels (organisational field or organisational level) (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012a). Certain organisations can be active in a variety of fields of the ones we listed as priority areas for ITSSOIN research. Fligstein and McAdam suggest two paths to describe field relations. They are either connected through actors that are described as internal governance units (IGU) or through a qualification of field relations (hierarchical or cooperative structures). Internal Governance Units are seen as actors that belong to one field and have the function to enhance stability in a field. In the field of economy these actors are typically trade associations but could also be regulatory state institutions. In their field they are typically responsible for administrative processes, distribution of information, regulation, application of rules, and certification. Innovation can disrupt these structures and be discouraged by such players.

Innovation is often spurred by 'episodes of contention' (McAdam, 2005). They begin with a mobilisation of actors as they see an opportunity to enforce their interests (here: address unmet social needs). By application of their skills contenders are able to constitute new routines (Fligstein, 2001). By forming coalitions with other actors in the field or in other fields even smaller actors can achieve this, as is demonstrated in relation to social movements and civic engagement (McAdam, 2005; McAdam, Edelman, & Leachman, 2010). The combined advocacy and service function introduced earlier can be a huge asset for third sector organisations to do so. This applies even more so when third sector organisations moderate innovation prompts 'from outside' by taking up, reacting to, or counteracting external shifts triggered for instance by 'political crises such as war, invasion, serious regime change, [or] economic collapse' (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012a, p. 101).

Bringing together these insights, some tentative hypotheses on the social innovation potential of the third sector can be formulated. It is assumed that the social innovation potential of the third sector increases:

- with the number of multi-stakeholder contacts (including the contacts to the commercial and public sphere, civic engagement);
- with the diversity of the resource base (including diversity in financial sources, volunteering, expertise, and knowledge);
- with the formulation of value sets that can 'connect' to others in terms of social mobilisations and dissemination.

The case study approach based on strategic action fields (ITSSOIN WPs 4-7) will enable us to gain substantial insights on how these factors play out. In a similar way will the policy analysis (ITSSOIN WP 2) account for the construction of the 'field of politics' and the analysis of media influences and citizen attitudes (also ITSSOIN WP 2) shape a 'field of public perception' surrounding social innovation. The analysis of volunteering will provide (ITSSOIN WP 3) a way to understand involved organisations (or other actors) as 'fields of engagement.'

These profiles together with a careful tracing of social innovation processes (in the tradition of process tracing methods applied to the analysis of policies or legislation in political science Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Tansey, 2007) will further enhance the dynamic perspective of the analysis, since they can serve to detect temporal shifts in conditional factors – some of which have become apparent in classification changes of particular countries – that have spurred or impeded social innovation. The latter will thus explicitly include the counterfactual, which is that under certain state-level conditions the third sector might dampen social innovation. An established system of contracting out most state-mandated services to the third sector might for instance create disincentives to innovate, due to relative inflexibility in actor constellations or the lack of room for experimentation (compare to the insights provided in Nock et al., 2013). Likewise, state policies that push third sector organisations to adopt more stringent accountability measures might reduce organisational autonomy and thereby turn into barriers to social innovation. In addition to openness to contextual factors, the chosen approach will have to be mindful of actor particularities in fields. For instance, a large non-profit sector in a field that is dominated by only few organisations may exert isomorphic pressures or incentivise the status quo; both factors are likely to impede social innovation.

Supposing that in the case work and by employing field theory and process tracing we are able to identify enough positive as well as negative cases of social innovations and their connected factors *and* have enough structural data at hand to relate this to, a follow-up to the research performed might (albeit not proving causal attribution) set some direction as to the most relevant factors in the causal complexity of social innovation (following the method of 'qualitative comparative analysis' Ragin, 1989; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This method could be used to effectively merge insights gained at the three interrelated levels of the ITSSOIN research.

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